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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2718
___________
DEREK N. JARVIS,
Appellant
v.
ANALYTICAL LABORATORY SERVICES;
ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY

____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 12-cv-00574 )
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 13, 2012
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 27, 2012)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Derek Jarvis, a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, appeals the District
Court‘s orders dismissing his complaint as barred by the doctrine of res judicata and
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denying his motion for reconsideration. We agree with the District Court‘s conclusions
regarding the application of res judicata in this matter. Because the appeal is without
legal merit and presents no substantial issue, we will summarily affirm the District
Court‘s orders.
I
The District Court dismissed Jarvis‘ complaint on res judicata grounds, citing two
prior cases that involve the same defendants and arise from the same set of facts. Jarvis
initially filed suit in 2007 in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
against his former employer and defendant in this action, Enterprise Leasing Company
(―Enterprise‖). In that action, he alleged workplace discrimination and retaliation on the
basis of events that occurred during the course of his employment from 2000 to 2007.
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Enterprise, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the United States
denied Jarvis‘ petitions for writ of certiorari and for a rehearing. See Jarvis v. Enterprise
Fleet Servs. and Leasing Co., No. 07-cv-3385, 2010 WL 1068146 (D. Md. Mar. 17,
2010), aff‘d, 408 Fed. App‘x. 668 (4th Cir. ), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3076 (2011) and
reh‘g denied, 132 S. Ct. 63 (2011).
While that lawsuit was pending, Jarvis applied for work with Analytical
Laboratory Services (―Analytical‖), the other defendant in this case. When Analytical
failed to get back to him, he lodged a discrimination claim with the EEOC. After
receiving the requisite right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, he filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that Analytical had
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discriminated against him. The District Court granted summary judgment in that action,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the
United States denied Jarvis‘ petition for writ of certiorari. See Jarvis v. Analytical Lab.
Servs., Inc., No. 10-cv-1540, 2011 WL 3680257 (D. Md. Aug. 19, 2011), aff‘d, 459 Fed.
Appx. 292 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. dismissed, 132 S. Ct. 1747 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2012).
Jarvis filed this lawsuit on March 29, 2012. In his complaint he alleged that
Enterprise ―blacklisted‖ him in retaliation for his race discrimination case against them
and that Analytical did not hire him as retaliation for the complaint that he had filed
against Enterprise. The District Court dismissed Jarvis‘ claims with prejudice on the
basis that the claims arose from the same set of facts as those in the two prior lawsuits
and are therefore barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Jarvis filed a timely motion for
reconsideration that the District Court denied.
II
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We exercise plenary review
over the application of res judicata. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d
169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).
The doctrine of res judicata bars a plaintiff who has received a final judgment on
the merits in an action from litigating another suit against the same parties based on the
same cause of action. See CoreStates Bank, N.A. v. Huls Am., Inc., 176 F.3d 187, 194
(3d Cir. 1999). The Court takes a broad view to determine if two suits are based on the
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In reviewing this matter, we have carefully considered the District Court record, as well
as the brief and response that Jarvis filed in this Court.
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same cause of action, ―looking to whether there is an ‗essential similarity of the
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.‘‖ Id. (quoting United States v.
Athlone Indus., 746 F.2d 977, 984 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Jarvis asks this Court if a complaint can be barred by res judicata when the
complaint is not identical to that in the earlier action. The answer is yes. As the District
Court properly noted, res judicata bars not only those claims that were brought in a prior
suit, but also those claims that could have been brought. See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at
172–74. Accordingly, the complaints need not be identical. For the same reason, the
mere inclusion of a new cause of action in a subsequent complaint will not rescue a
lawsuit from res judicata where the underlying events that give rise to the new
allegations are essentially the same as those in the earlier action.
Scrutiny of the three complaints and accompanying exhibits leaves no doubt that
this action arises from the same set of facts as those in the earlier cases. 2 A review of the
lengthy dockets in the prior actions makes it abundantly clear that Jarvis had a full and
fair opportunity to litigate this matter in the District of Maryland, and that the District
Court reached a final determination on the merits in each case. Accordingly, the District
Court correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata to dismiss this case.
III
The District Court also properly denied Jarvis‘ motion to reconsider. We review
the District Court‘s denial of the motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See
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The District Court took judicial notice of the prior proceedings for the purposes of
screening the complaint. See June 4, 2012 Memorandum, Dkt. 7, n.1. Accordingly, we
review those complaints as part of the record.
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generally Koshatka v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).
In support of the motion to reconsider, Jarvis argued that the District Court erred in its
determination that the alleged retaliation occurred on June 8, 2008 because the
administrative charge associated with the claim was filed in 2011. The Charge of
Discrimination form that Jarvis submitted to the EEOC regarding the retaliation claim,
however, explicitly states that the alleged retaliatory discrimination took place between
April 18, 2007 and June 8, 2008. See Complaint, Dkt. 1 at 19. In addition, Jarvis‘
complaint states that Analytical ―engaged in retaliatory Blacklisting, [sic] when it
rejected Plaintiff from employment based on his complaint against former employer
[Enterprise] for wage bias, race discrimination and retaliatory discharge.‖ Id. at 3. On
the face of Jarvis‘ own submissions, the retaliation claim arises from Analytical‘s
rejection of Jarvis‘ application for employment in 2008—the same event around which
the prior litigation against Analytical was centered.
To the extent that Jarvis is attempting to argue that he did not discover the alleged
blacklisting until early 2011, when he claims Analytical raised a ―blacklisting defense‖ in
their summary judgment motion, he failed to provide any meaningful support for that
argument. Newly discovered evidence does not prevent the application of res judicata
unless it was either fraudulently concealed or it could not have been discovered with due
diligence. See, e.g., L-Tec Electronics Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 88
(2d Cir. 1999). Jarvis has failed to show that such circumstances are present here.
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jarvis‘ motion to
reconsider.
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IV
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment entered by the District Court.
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